Corruption and Financial Intermediation in a Panel of Regions: Cross-Border Effects of Corruption by Majeed, Muhammad Tariq & MacDonald, Ronald
scottish institute for research in economics
SIRE DISCUSSION PAPER
SIRE-DP-2011-67
Corruption and Financial Intermediation in a Panel of 
Regions: Cross-Border Effects of Corruption
Muhammad Tariq Majeed
Ronald MacDonald
University of Glasgow 
www.sire.ac.uk
Corruption and Financial Intermediation in a Panel of Regions: Cross-Border 
Effects of Corruption 
 
Muhammad Tariq Majeed*     Ronald MacDonald 
University of Glasgow      University of Glasgow 
June 2011 
 
Abstract 
The importance of financial market reforms in combating corruption has been 
highlighted in the theoretical literature but has not been systemically tested empirically. 
In this study we provide a first pass at testing this relationship using both linear and non-
monotonic forms of the relationship between corruption and financial intermediation. Our 
study finds a negative and statistically significant impact of financial intermediation on 
corruption. Specifically, the results imply that a one standard deviation increase in 
financial intermediation is associated with a decrease in corruption of 0.20 points, or 16 
percent of the standard deviation in the corruption index and this relationship is shown to 
be robust to a variety of specification changes, including: (i) different sets of control 
variables; (ii) different econometrics techniques; (iii) different sample sizes; (iv) 
alternative corruption indices; (v) removal of outliers; (vi) different sets of panels; and 
(vii) allowing for cross country interdependence, contagion effects, of corruption. 
 
JEL Classification: C23, D72, K42, H1, O50  
 
Keywords: corruption; contagion effects; financial Intermediation; panel data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
*Corresponding author: Department of Economics, Adam Smith Building, Glasgow, G12 
8RT, United Kingdom; Tel: +44 (0)141-330 4697; Fax: +44 (0)141-330 4940; 
m.majeed.1@research.gla.ac.uk or tariq@qau.edu.pk 
 1
 
1. Introduction 
 
Corruption is worse than prostitution. The latter might endanger 
the morals of an individual, the former invariably endangers the 
morale of the entire country- Karl Krauss 
 
In recent years, the wide spread prevalence of corruption across nations, particularly in 
developing countries, has attracted the attention of economists and policy makers. 
Understanding the significant effects of corruption on a country’s development process 
has motivated researchers to investigate why corruption exists and what determines its 
high degree of variation across countries. A number of empirical studies have recently 
identified a large set of causes of corruption such as economic, cultural, political and 
institutional aspects (see, for example, Treisman, 2000; Serra, 2006; Majeed and 
MacDonald, 2010). However, some of the channels of corruption still remain to be fully 
explored, such as the role of market imperfections for rent seeking and corrupt activities.  
For example, a lack of competition, in product and financial markets, fosters 
corruption because rent seeking activities increase in the absence of competition and such 
rent seeking activities are closely associated with corruption levels. Theoretical studies 
predict an ambiguous effects of competition on corruption. On the one hand, lack of 
competition generates rents (supra normal profits) for entrepreneurs, thereby motivating 
bureaucrats to ask for bribery (Foellmi and Oechslin (2007). On the other hand, the 
presence of these rents increases the values of monitoring the bureaucracy in a society 
(Ades and Di Tella (1999). 
 This study focuses on the lack of competition in financial markets where lower 
levels of financial intermediation are taken to indicate underdeveloped financial systems. 
Foellmi and Oechslin (2007) argue that less developed financial systems strengthen 
economic elites and these economic elites can substantially oppose/hinder anti-corruption 
reforms if political power is concentrated in their hands. Boerner and Hainz (2009) 
predict an ambiguous relationship between financial sector reforms and corruption. Their 
results are conditional on the political weights of different groups and according to their 
model, financial sector reforms can lower corruption only if the political influence of 
relatives (other groups) dominates over the political influence of corrupt officials.  
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The motivation for testing the impact of financial intermediation on corruption is 
three fold. First, theoretical studies predict a relationship between financial reforms and 
corruption but to the best of our knowledge this relationship has not been tested. Second, 
theoretical studies predict ambiguous effects of financial reforms on corruption and this 
can only be clarified in an empirical setting. Third, theoretical studies indicate the 
importance of a threshold in shaping the link between corruption and financial reforms 
and again this can only be clarified in an empirical context. 
The existing literature on the causes of corruption explicitly or implicitly assumes 
that corruption is determined by country specific factors; in other words, corruption is 
independent of corruption in neighboring countries. However, in practice, neighboring 
countries share common political cultures and adopt similar institutions. These common 
political cultures are very close to corruption (see, for example, Hillman and Swank, 
2000). In this study, we explicitly control for cross-country interdependence of corruption 
using a spatially weighted matrix.  
The motivation for spatial analysis of corruption is two fold. First, cultural 
reasons of corruption are closely related to cross country interdependence of corruption, 
as norms about corruption tolerance are more likely to spread to neighboring countries as 
compared to distant countries. Such interdependence of corruption implies that corruption 
levels may vary less within a region because of similar cultural reasons (for example, 
Paldam (2002) points out that corruption is mainly supported by cultural factors). Second, 
Becker et al. (2009) provide empirical evidence of cross country interdependence of 
corruption. 
 In sum, this study has a number of unique and novel elements compared to extant 
work in this area. First, we believe that this is the first study that tests empirically the 
relationship between the financial intermediation and corruption. Second, this is also the 
first study to test for the presence of a threshold in shaping the link between corruption 
and financial development. Third, our study introduces the concept of regional panels in 
addition to cross sectional or cross country panels. Fourth, we introduce the concept of 
alternative lag lengths to trace out the repercussion effects of policy reforms in 
neighboring countries. Fifth, we model the role of spatially weighted corruption that takes 
account of the common political, cultural and regional factors and, sixth, we use a variety 
 3
of econometric techniques to account for time dynamics and to control for the possible 
problem of endogeneity.  
This paper, specifically, adds to this emerging literature on corruption by 
addressing the following questions: (1) Does high financial intermediation reduce 
corruption?; (2) Is the relationship between high financial intermediation and corruption 
perhaps non-monotonic?; (3) Does spatial corruption matter in shaping the link? (4) Do 
past levels of corruption in neighboring countries matter for current corruption in home 
countries? (5) Do regional panels make difference in shaping the link?  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review 
of the relevant literature and Section 3 provides a discussion of the data. In Section 4 we 
present our modeling framework and our estimation methods, while in Section 5 our 
empirical findings are presented. Section 6 is our concluding section.  
 
2. Literature Review  
In the first part of this section we briefly review the relevant theoretical literature 
on the relationship between financial reforms and corruption, while in the second part we 
review empirical studies on contagion and corruption and then summarize our discussion 
in a flow chart.  
2.1 Review of Theoretical Studies on Financial Markets and Corruption  
Mckinnon (1973) argues that the development of a capital market is “necessary and 
sufficient” to foster the “adoption of best-practice technologies and learning by doing.” In 
other words, limited access to credit markets restricts entrepreneurial development, 
thereby leaving more space for rent seeking and corrupt activities. In this study we extend 
this view and argue that the absence of well functioning local financial markets can limit 
the availability of funds through formal recourses and incite an individual to seek other 
viable options for finance, from, say, the informal economy where the margin for bribes 
and rent seeking activities is likely to be significant. 
Ades and Di Tella (1999), provide further insights into the corruption-rent seeking 
mechanism. They present evidence that the level of rents in general, and market structure 
in particular, determine the intensity of corruption in an economy. They argue that 
variation in rent size, as a result of changes in competition, causes ambiguous effects on 
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corruption: on the one hand, lower levels of competition provide opportunities to 
bureaucrats to extract more rents from the firms they control, while on the other hand, 
this situation also implies that it is more valuable for a society to avoid corruption and 
increase the accountability and monitoring of its bureaucracy. Thus, theoretically, the net 
impact of competition on corruption is ambiguous.  
Recently, Foellmi and Oechslin (2007) focus on the lack of competition in 
financial markets in shaping the theoretical relationship between rent and corruption. 
They build a general equilibrium model with credit market imperfections and 
heterogeneous agents to explain the causes and consequences of non-collusive 
corruption1. The model features two types of individuals: potential entrepreneurs and the 
officials and where the potential entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in terms of ex ante 
wealth, while officials do not have any ex ante wealth endowment. This model predicts 
that credit market imperfections generate rents for the incumbent entrepreneur and the 
availability of these rents leaves the margin for an official with discretionary power to ask 
for a bribe because he knows that the alternative viable investment options to the 
incumbent yield much lower returns. If sanctions against bribes are also imperfect then 
the rents may be partially extracted by corrupt officials. However, in the case of a well 
developed financial system (i.e. countries with (nearly) perfect markets) returns 
inequalities across investment projects are eroded and there is a disincentive for the 
incumbent to consider a bribe and therefore, a corrupt official will not seek bribes in such 
a situation, even though the probability of being detected and punished is low. Foellmi 
and Oechslin predict that financially developed economies tend to be less corrupt because 
rents are lower in these economies.  
Foellmi and Oechslin (2007) also derive the income distributional consequences 
from their model and predict that non-collusive corruption redistributes income from the 
entrepreneur (non officials) towards corrupt officials and also income is redistributed 
within the entrepreneurial group. The middle class losses (suffers) from more corruption 
while the wealthy entrepreneurs are less affected or they even win. Paying bribes 
adversely affects the size of collateral and thus borrowing decreases and the individuals 
who lack collateral and rely on borrowing to finance investment projects of minimal size 
                                                          
1 Non-collusive corruption means additional cost on private business activity. 
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suffer, specifically when credit restrictions are more severe. Some of the members of the 
middle class will not consider becoming an entrepreneur as a viable option and may quit 
the market causing a decline in aggregate demand for capital, thereby decreasing the cost 
of capital. Larger borrowers benefit more from the lower cost of capital, because this 
benefit (i.e. the general equilibrium effect) is strong enough to outweigh the costs of 
bribes. The largest borrowers are more affluent because their ex ante wealth plays the role 
of collateral. Another implication of the crowding out effect is that it may reduce 
competition on the product market as well, thereby amplifying the distribution 
consequences among the entrepreneurs (non-officials). The distributional consequences 
of the model suggest that less developed financial systems (credit market imperfections) 
strengthen economic elites, thereby anti-corruption reforms can be substantially 
opposed/hindered if political power is concentrated in the hands of economic elites. 
 Foellmi and Oechslin (2007) further argue that improving financial market 
conditions does not necessarily imply that the level of corruption will decline. If contract 
enforcement starts improving from a low level then initially corruption may rise and after 
reaching a certain threshold level of the contract enforcement it will fall. This happens 
because improving enforcement initially softens the borrowing constraints for 
entrepreneurs since higher capital demand does not affect the interest rate as the supply of 
capital is perfectly elastic. Other things equal, therefore, corrupt officials face bribe 
margins from an entrepreneur and therefore ask for higher bribes. Thereafter, improving 
contract enforcement no longer creates new entrepreneurs since the borrowing constraints 
have already been softened and the better enforcement increases the interest rate. These 
two effects work in opposite directions offsetting each other and the amount of bribes 
remains unchanged. Thereafter, further improvements in contract enforcement reduce 
optimal bribes because now entrepreneurship is not a viable option and becoming a 
lender is more attractive. In this situation, individuals have an incentive to take advantage 
of investing opportunities with higher returns outside their own firms.  
Recently, Boerner and Hainz (2009) also provide a theoretical link between 
financial reforms and persistent corruption using a probabilistic voting model. The basic 
proposition of their model is that corrupt officials have to pay entry fees to get lucrative 
positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy. In the presence of imperfect credit market, the 
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corrupt officials arrange part of their finances from the informal market using personal 
connections, such as relatives. In doing so, they in fact give a stake in corruption to their 
relatives. This unproductive investment is viable for the relatives because economic 
opportunities are scarce and it implies that the stake-holders (the creditors) are likely to 
oppose anti-corruption reforms because they finance corrupt incumbent officials in view 
of a share in prospective rents.  
If credit market imperfections are lower and the financial sector is liberalized then 
all citizens have access to loans. In the presence of wider opportunities for loans, corrupt 
officials can finance their entry fee through financial market instead of relatives and in 
the presence of a developed financial system, support for anti-corruption policies is the 
likely outcome. 
The analysis of Boerner and Hainz shows that economic and financial reforms 
generate investment opportunities in productive sectors. These opportunities play an 
important role in shaping the political preferences of agents that, in turn, support the fight 
against corruption. While in the absence of these reforms, and thus the absence of 
productive investment opportunities, the rational agents tend to invest in unproductive 
corrupt activities by financing entry fees. Consequently, both corrupt officials and their 
financers do not support socially beneficial political initiatives to abolish unproductive 
activities. Thus, the political success of anti-corruption policies depends on economic and 
financial liberalization. The Boerner and Hainz study predicts unambiguous results in the 
case of reforms of the real sector because these reforms promote entrepreneurship in 
productive sectors. However, in the case of reforms of the financial sector the study 
provides ambiguous results since the results are conditional on the political weights of 
different groups. If the political influence of relatives dominates over the political 
influence of corrupt officials then financial sector reforms unambiguously help to fight 
against corruption. 
 The ambiguous theoretical predictions of the link between financial sector 
reforms and corruption in the above studies, and the possible presence of a threshold 
level, can only be confirmed or rejected by an empirical test. That is what we attempt to 
do in this study.  
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 2.3 Corruption and Contagion  
The existing literature on the causes of corruption is mainly based on the assumption that 
corruption is a country specific phenomenon and the prevalence of corruption in a 
country is independent of the prevalence of corruption in adjacent countries. However, 
some recent studies have pointed out that institutions in neighboring countries are similar 
and the similarity of these institutions breeds a similar pattern of political culture and this 
political culture is closely associated with levels of corruption (Becker et al (2009); 
Hillman and Swank, 2000) 
In order to support the argument of so-called contagion corruption, a number of 
justifications are noted here. First, interdependence of cross country business has 
increased in recent years and norms about corruption are more likely to shift from one 
country to another due to learning and peer-group behavior (see, for example, Fisman and 
Miguel, 2007, 2008). Second, corruption also spreads due to a demonstration effect; for 
example, existing levels of corruption in a country induce foreigners to get involved in 
corruption as well (see, for example, Goel and Nelson, 2007, for evidence of contagion 
corruption across US states). Third, recently curbing global corruption has been put on 
the agenda of international organizations such as the UNO, World Bank, IMF and WTO 
and they are now attempting to propagating corruption free societies. Fourth, corruption 
norms are spreading across borders because the awareness of individuals about corruption 
is increasing due to increased corruption surveys and its portrayal in the media. This can 
also propagate (non-) corrupt behavior across countries. A flow chart, given below, 
summarizes the above discussion.  
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 2.3 Description of channels through which corruption becomes contagion                                                  
Contagion Effects of Corruption 
Fisman and Miguel (2007, 2008); Goel and Nelson (2007); 
Becker et al. (2009) 
                      
                                                                                                                                                          
Increasing 
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country corruption 
Integration of cross 
county business  
Demonstration 
effects 
Supranational 
attempts  
                                    
Inducement for 
corruption  
                                                                                                                                                          
Agenda of 
international 
organization to curb 
global corruption 
Cross country intensive 
business contracts  
Perception of 
corruption spread  
       
                                                                                                               
Regional corruption 
controlling association 
                                                        
It is 
considered 
as a norm
(Non-) corrupt behaviour 
spread due to learning and
peer-group behaviour 
            
                                                                                                                                                                              
Cross-country interdependence of corruption
3. Data Description 
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index and corruption perception 
index (CPI) by Transparency International are both used in corruption studies. We prefer 
to use the ICRG, since most previous studies use it and the index covers a large number 
of countries and a long period of time. The ICRG also has a high correlation with other 
indices that have been used in the literature, such as the Transparency International and 
Business International (see Treisman, 2000; Majeed and Macdonald (2010) for more 
details) indices2. We also use alternative corruption indices as a robustness check. The 
other variables used in this study are reported in Table 1. We average the data over a 5-
year non-overlapping period, 1984-2007. In this way we have five observations, in most 
                                                          
2 Recently, Majeed and Macdonald (2010) show a correlation between these alternative corruption indices 
over the period 1996-2007. They show that the correlation between ICRG and TI corruption indices is 0.87, 
while the correlation between ICRG and World Bank (WB)’s corruption indices is 0.88. Finally, their study 
shows a very high correlation, 0.98, between TI and WB. These high correlations indicate that these 
alternative corruption indices are consistent, even though they are based on a subjective rating. 
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instances, for all of the countries in our sample. The 5 year average periods are: 1984-88, 
1989-93, 1994-98, 1999-03, 2004-07.  
We introduce the concept of regional panels in the following way. We calculate the 
average of a variable of interest for all countries in a specific region, such as East Asia 
and Pacific (EAP), for a specific year, such as the initial year of data, 1984. In this way 
we average all of the variables for all regions. In order to account for time dynamics 
within a region, we repeat our averaging exercise for each year until 2007. We have nine 
regions in total: East Asia & Pacific, Europe & Central Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, 
Middle East & North Africa, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, Australia-Oceania, 
and North America. To the best of our knowledge this is the first study using panel data 
that introduces an entirely different method of data analysis. This innovative exercise of 
regional panels has several advantages. First, it serves as a robustness check. Second, it 
does not assume that cross country corruption (within a region) is independent. Third, it 
takes account of the time element in the data. Fourth, cultural, political and institutional 
similarities within a region are better captured by using regional panels. 
 
4. Model  
The theoretical formation of a model for this study relies on Becker (1968)’s seminal 
work where individuals make rational choices by giving weights to relative costs and 
benefits of an illegal (corrupt) activity. These costs and benefits depend on exogenous 
factors that, in turn, depend on the role of market structure and the socio-cultural 
environment. The socio-cultural environment is developed by historical, legal, political, 
regional and country-specific factors. This study takes into account all of these factors for 
an empirical analysis. The specified standard corruption equation is given as follows: 
ittitititititit XFIPCYC ενμβββα ++++++= 321 ,     (1) 
where (i= 1… N; t=1…     T), Cit is a perceived corruption index, PCYit is per capita 
income to measure the level of economic development, FIit represents the degree of 
financial intermediation, Xit represents a set of control variables based on the existing 
corruption literature, ui is a country specific unobservable effect, vt is a time specific 
factor and εit is an i.i.d. disturbance term. The expected sign for the key parameter of 
interest, β2, is negative. 
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In addition to the other terms contained in equation 1, equation 2 includes a non-linear 
term for financial intermediation (FI2) to facilitate an assessment of the possible presence 
of a threshold level of financial intermediation. Now the expected sign for β2 is positive 
while it is negative for β3. 
ittititititititit XFIFIPCYC ενμββββα +++++++= 42321 …..….………..…….…. (2) 
 
 
 
Equation 3 includes another key determinant of corruption, the military in politics (MP), 
that has recently been introduced by Majeed and MacDonald (2010). The authors suggest 
that the explanatory power of the military in politics is at least as important as the 
conventionally accepted causes of corruption, such as economic development. The 
expected sign of the parameter on MP, β4, is negative. 
 
ittitititititititit XMPFIFIPCYC ενμβββββα ++++++++= 542321 ……………..... (3) 
 
In a very recent paper Becker et al. (2009) estimate cross country interdependence 
of corruption as a key variable of concern for 123 economies and provide significant 
evidence of contagious corruption. Our study evaluates financial liberalization and the 
contagion nature of corruption by using standard corruption equations and following an 
econometric model set out in Becker at el. (2009). While taking account of the contagion 
nature of corruption we differ from Becker at el. (2009) by considering alternative lag 
lengths of contagious corruption. We introduce 5, 10, 15 and 20 year lags in order to 
assess the lag nature of spatial corruption so that policy makers can effectively devise 
anti-corruption polices by taking account of beggar thy neighbor polices affecting the 
optimality of domestic policy initiatives. Becker et al. (2009) use conventional control 
variables of corruption while we use new measures of corruption, such as the military in 
politics. In addition, we also consider contagious corruption as a robustness check for our 
main variable of concern, financial intermediation. 
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Controlling for cross-country interdependence requires a suitable econometric 
model. One class of models that supports such interdependence is a spatial econometric 
model. The term has its origins in geographical statistics which in the past was the main 
application for such methods. However, in recent years, economists have discovered 
potential merits of such methods to analyze interdependence brought about by general 
equilibrium effects. Put differently, spatial econometrics involves the development of 
methods and statistical tools for the analysis of spatial interactions (spatial auto 
correlation), learning effects, externalities, spillovers and spatial structure (especially 
heterogeneity).  
The key difference between spatial econometrics and traditional econometrics is 
that the former addresses a locational component. Two issues arise from such a 
component: the first is the existence of spatial dependence between observations and the 
second is the occurrence of spatial heterogeneity in the relationship. Traditional 
econometrics largely ignores such issues but they violate the traditional Gauss-Markov 
assumptions used in regression modeling. For example, one assumption in the Gauss-
Markov framework is that the explanatory variables remain fixed in repeated sampling 
but spatial dependence violates this assumption, as does the assumption that a single line 
relationship exists across the sample data observations (Lesage, 1998).  
In order to analyze the notion of interdependence across countries, spatial 
econometric models need an assumption regarding the nature of the interdependence. In 
applied research, researchers normally assume that interdependence is associated with 
space and geography and that interdependence is positively related to adjacency and 
negatively related to distance. Although there are many ways to model adjacency 
interdependence econometrically, here we consider two forms (following Becker et al., 
2009), and these are spatial lags and spatially autoregressive residuals. The exclusion of 
significant spatial dependence in the residuals produces inefficient parameter estimates. 
Similarly the exclusion of related spatial lags yields inconsistent parameter estimates. In 
the context of our analysis, taking account of spatial lags implies that corruption in some 
country i depends on the corruption in j countries. Put differently, the level of corruption 
in country i is an adjacency (or inverse-distance-related) function of corruption in other 
countries. Similarly, another implication in our context is that the disturbance term of 
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country i depends on the disturbance terms of other economies. In other words, country 
i’s disturbance term is an adjacency (or inverse-distance-related) function of other 
countries, disturbances. The model can be specified as follows:  
 
j
N
j ijiij
N
j iji
wpXcwc μμμβλα ∑∑ == =+++= 11 ;  ,……….. (4)                                
 
where ci stands for corruption in country i, and wij is an adjacency-related weight. The wij 
has two properties that are, ∑  and wii =0,= =Nj ijw1 1 3 and xi is a 1× K vector of covariates. 
The greek letters α, λ, and β refer to unknown parameters that require to be estimated. α 
is an intercept while β is a K ×1 parameter vector for the covariates collected in xi. Two 
parameter, λ and ρ, measure the intensity (strength) of interdependence, where λ denotes 
the spatial lag and ρ represents the spatial correlation in the residuals. In our analysis, we 
focus mainly on the spatial lag parameter λ since interdependence in terms of observable 
characteristics appears of more concern to economists and policy makers than 
interdependence in the disturbances. Finally, µi is the overall (spatially correlated) 
disturbance term and vi is the remaining disturbance term which is independently (but not 
necessarily identically) distributed across all countries i. 
 
5. Results and Interpretation  
 
Table 1 provides our base line results for the effect of financial liberalization on 
corruption for a cross section of 120 economies. All columns of the table indicate that the 
impact of high financial intermediation (FI) on corruption is negative and significant. The 
estimated coefficient on financial Intermediation is remarkably robust and its size 
remains 0.001 in all the regressions. This finding implies that a one standard deviation 
increase in FI is associated with a decrease in corruption of 0.20 points, or 16 percent of a 
                                                          
3 For adjacency weights, we develop a country-by-country matrix using unitary values for countries share 
common land borders and zero otherwise. According to this rule islands do not have neighbors and also 
country-pairs with a common border that is not on land do not have a border, accordingly. The 
normalization divides all unitary entries by the sum of all neighbors for each country (Becker et al., 2009).  
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standard deviation in the corruption index. All other variables in the regressions turn out 
to be significant with the expected signs and the overall fit of the model is good. 
The effect of economic development is consistently negative and significant in all 
regressions in this table, and in subsequent tables, which implies that countries at the 
bottom of the ladder of economic development tend to be more corrupt. This happens 
because poor countries generate minimal wealth effects for average citizens and lower 
incomes create structural incentives for corrupt behavior. Conversely, countries at the 
upper end of the ladder of economic development tend to be less corrupt because the 
discount rates of potential bribe takers and givers are lower in rich nations. Economic 
freedom and rule of law are negatively and significantly associated with corruption 
levels. A greater degree of economic freedom and a strong hold of law discourage 
corruption prone activities because economic freedom promotes productive business 
activities and similarly a strong rule of law discourages bureaucrats to ask for bribes. 
Furthermore, greater economic freedom implies a free flow of market forces and lesser 
government controls thereby less opportunities for rent seeking by government officials.  
Table 2 replicates the results of Table 1 using alternative corruption indices and, 
again, the estimated coefficients for FI are significant in all columns and of the expected 
signs. This means the relationship between financial intermediation and corruption levels 
is negative, irrespective of which corruption index is being used for estimation. Columns 
2-5 show parameter estimates using the Transparency International corruption index, 
while column 6-8 represents parameter estimates drawn using World Bank corruption 
index. Parameter estimates for other control variables are similar to the results of Table 1. 
 Table 3 replicates the benchmark findings using additional control variables and 
the benchmark findings turn out to be consistent to the addition of these control variables. 
The coefficient on FI remains robustly negative and significant at -0.001. Among the 
additional control variables - democracy, military in politics and military spending – all 
are significant with the correct signs. This analysis shows that democracy turns out to be 
most significant additional control variable, followed by military related variables. We 
believe that it is now widely accepted that corruption is rooted in various forms of 
political deficiencies. An established democracy promotes political competition, 
transparency and accountability (to the voter), thereby reducing corruption. To address 
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this we can either control for military expenditures or for the role of the military in 
politics and both turn out to be negative and significant, and this finding is consistent 
with Majeed and MacDonald, 2010. The involvement of military in politics engenders 
corruption because military is not elected by any one and accountability of the military 
elites is limited (see for further details Majeed and MacDonald, 2010).   
Table 4 replicates the findings of Table 1 while controlling for regional dummies. 
The coefficient on FI, 0.001, remains robustly negative and the level of significance 
slightly improves. The last column of the table indicates that all of the regional dummies 
are positive and significant, implying that regional factors are important in explaining 
corruption. 
Table 5 provides the results for the benchmark model using a panel of nine 
regions: East Asia & Pacific, Europe & Central Asia, Lat America & Caribbean, Middle 
East & North Africa, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, Australia-Oceania, and 
North America. In absolute terms, the estimated coefficient on FI improves from 0.001 to 
0.002 and the level of significance also improves as well. This finding implies that a one 
standard deviation increase in FI is associated with a decrease in corruption of 0.40 
points.  
Table 6 replicates the results of Table 5, using alternative econometric techniques 
and controlling for the issue of endogeneity. The estimated coefficients for FI are again 
significant in all columns and of the expected signs. In this study we develop regional 
panels that differ in two ways from cross country panels. First, each region comprises an 
annual observation to take account of time dynamics. Second, countries within a region 
share borders that capture the contagious nature of corruption (meaning that cross country 
corruption is not independent). Following the theory of contagion effects of corruption, 
the identification of a country is not of such importance as the identity of a region and the 
time element. It is noteworthy that the quality of the results improves in a regional panel 
in terms of the level of significance, the size of coefficients and direction of effects 
compared to all other ways of data analysis. 
Table 7 contains estimates of the benchmark model using a panel of 146 
economies. This shows that our benchmark findings are robust and the size of the 
estimated coefficient on FI is 0.0004 implying that a one standard deviation increase in FI 
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reduces corruption by 0.08 points. Findings for other control variables remain unaffected 
and the overall results seem to improve in a panel setting. The effect of government 
spending is significant with negative signs, implying that a larger government may spend 
more money to strengthen check and balances on corrupt activities. 
Table 8 contains a sensitivity analysis for FI and corruption in a panel setting. 
Here we employ eleven additional control variables and find that FI is robustly significant 
in explaining corruption: the coefficient on FI fluctuates between 0.0004 and 0.0005 in all 
of the regressions. In the table the most significant additional control variables turn out to 
be inflation, openness, democracy and the military in politics. The effect of inflation is 
positive because inflation is an indicator of macroeconomic instability. Our results here 
are consistent with Paldam, 2002; Majeed and Macdonald, 2010.  
Table 9 contains further results for the benchmark model using a panel of 146 
countries with additional control variables. The results indicate that investment profile is 
the most significant factor in this sensitivity analysis. We also control for time dummies 
and our results remain robust. In sum, we infer two points from the results displayed in 
Tables 8 and 9: (1) our benchmark finding remains robust; (2) the parameter estimates 
drawn from additional control variables are similar to the prediction of the existing 
literature on the causes of corruption. 
In Tables 10 and 11 we re-estimate our benchmark model using a random effects 
estimator. Our main variable of interest, FI, is still significant with a negative sign, 
although the size of coefficient drops slightly. Our main control variables - economic 
development, economic freedom, rule of law and government spending - are the same in 
terms of the level of significance and direction of effect. In our sensitivity analysis we 
include thirteen additional control variables, other than four time dummies and six 
regional dummies. Among the additional control variables military in politics is 
consistently positive and significant in increasing corruption. All other control variables 
are robust in terms of signs; however, some of them decrease or increase in terms of the 
level of significance. For example, inflation drops in significance, while investment 
profile increases in significance. 
Table 12 contains estimates of the benchmark model using a systems GMM 
estimator. Using this technique our results improve in terms of the level of significance 
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and remain the same in terms of the direction of effect. The coefficient on FI is 0.0004 in 
all of the regression and this implies that a one standard deviation increase in FI reduces 
corruption by 0.08 points. 
Table 13 reports results for a sub sample of developing counties and our 
benchmark findings turn out to be confirmed in this sample as well. The estimated 
coefficient on FI is consistently 0.001 in all columns of the table which implies that a one 
standard deviation increase in FI is associated with a decrease in corruption of 0.20 
points, or 16 percent of a standard deviation in the corruption index. 
We also test for the presence of a threshold in the relationship between FI and 
corruption for a cross section of 116 countries using alternative corruption indices. The 
parameter estimates for FI and FI2 indicate the presence of a threshold. This implies that 
high financial intermediation is beneficial only up to a threshold level and after the 
threshold is reached corruption increases. This finding contradicts that of Foellmi and 
Oechslin (2007) who predict the opposite, that initially high financial liberalization 
increases corruption and after a certain threshold level is reached it decreases corruption. 
There argument is that at an initial phase of financial liberalization interest rate remains 
the same due to an elastic supply of capital and this leaves a margin for bribe paying. 
However, over time the interest rate rises and the margin for bribe paying vanishes. 
However, the theoretical prediction of Boerner and Hainz (2009) is consistent 
with our empirical finding since they argue that a high level of financial liberalization 
make funds available in the formal sector and relatives do not have a stake in corruption 
thereby they support anti corruption policies. Boerner and Hainz are, however, not certain 
about the political weights of the different groups. For example, if the political weight of 
relatives is less than that of corrupt government officials corruption may increase in 
economies which have a high degree of financial reform. 
Ours is the first study that attempts to provide an empirical understanding of 
threshold in view of conflicting predictions of threshold theoretical studies. A 
comprehensive understanding of the threshold effects of financial reforms on corruption 
requires further theoretical and empirical work. One possible reason for this non-
monotonic relationship between FI and corruption could be that financial reforms with 
out regulation may become negative for the economy after a certain point.  
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Table 15 provides a set of results in which the most/least corrupt nations have 
been excluded. Specifically, in columns 3-4 we exclude the most clean countries, while in 
columns 5-6 we exclude the most corrupt nations. The results of Table 15 demonstrate 
that our benchmark findings remain consistent. 
Finally, in Tables 16 and 17 we provide a set of results that take account of the 
contagion effects of corruption. The purpose of incorporating contagion effects is 
threefold. First, to test whether spatial affects matter. Second, to check whether our 
bench-mark findings are consistent and, third, to test the lag length of contagion effects. 
Our results show that contagion effects persist and affect corruption levels significantly 
and our benchmark findings prove to be consistent and robust. The estimated coefficient 
on FI is consistently 0.001 in all the regressions. The estimated coefficient on the spatial 
index is about 0.2, which implies that a policy that reduces corruption by one standard 
deviation in the home country will reduce corruption by 0.114 in the neighboring country. 
In order to assess the lag nature of the spatial corruption phenomenon, we 
introduce 5, 10 year, 15 year and 20 year lags of spatially weighted corruption, 
respectively. Although each lag length is significant in explaining corruption but we infer 
that the most effective lag length is 5 to 10 years because models with other lag lengths 
do not perform well as the level of economic development becomes insignificant. First 
column of the table shows that estimated coefficient on contagion effects is 0.21 which 
implies that a policy in neighboring country that reduces corruption one standard 
deviation in past five to ten years will reduce corruption in the home country by 0.12 
points. 
 
6. Conclusion  
In recent years, international organizations such as the World Bank, IMF and UNO have 
set the elimination of corruption as their prime goal. Additionally, regional organizations 
and domestic governments have advocated and devised anti corruption policies. 
According to the Global Corruption Barometer (2010) “corruption has increased over the 
last three years say six out of 10 people around the world, and one in four people report 
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paying bribes in the last year”4. The literature has identified a large number of factors that 
cause corruption, such as economic, political, cultural and institutional aspects. Although 
some of the determinants of corruption are inconclusive, a consensus is slowly emerging 
on the key causes of corruption. For instance Serra (2006) identifies economic 
development, democracy, and political stability as important causes of corruption. Our 
study differs from existing studies on the causes of corruption by empirically analyzing 
the importance of financial market imperfections for cross country variations of 
corruption levels. 
 The importance of financial market liberalization in combating corruption has 
been highlighted in the theoretical literature but no one has tested this relationship in an 
empirical settings. This study contributes to the existing literature on the causes of 
corruption by introducing the linear and non-monotonic relationship of corruption and 
financial liberalization. By drawing on a large cross sectional, country panels and 
regional panel data sets over a long period of time (1984-2007), our analysis finds 
substantial support for a negative relationship between financial intermediation and 
corruption. The results imply that a one standard deviation increase in financial 
liberalization is associated with a decrease in corruption of 0.20 points, or 16 percent of a 
standard deviation in the corruption index. Our findings are consistent with respect to a 
number of robustness checks, including incorporating contagion effects alternative 
corruption indices and regional dynamics. 
Finally, the existing literature on corruption assumes that the prevalence of 
corruption is determined by country specific factors. Nonetheless, some studies point to 
corruption as being interdependent across bordering countries and it is a common 
characteristic of low income countries. For example, Rowley (2000) argues that a 
common political culture in Africa caused corruption to be the norm in these countries. 
We also contribute to this part of the literature by evaluating the different lag lengths of 
contagious corruption. Our results show that a policy in a neighboring country that 
reduces corruption by one standard deviation in the past five to ten years will reduce 
corruption in the home country by 0.12 points. 
                                                          
4 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2010 
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 Table 1: Corruption and Financial Intermediation (FI): Cross Section (CS) Estimation 
Variables Dependent Variable: Corruption 
FI -0.004 
(-4.38)* 
-0.001 
(-1.75)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.66)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.78)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.72)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.68)*** 
PCY  -0.000 
(-8.18)* 
-0.000 
(-6.18)* 
-0.000 
(-5.25)* 
-0.000 
(-2.62)* 
-0.000 
(-2.73)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
  -0.23 
(-5.33)* 
-0.22 
(-5.41)* 
-0.19 
(-4.58)* 
-0.19 
(-4.55)* 
Govt. 
Spending  
   -0.025 
(-2.18)** 
-0.011 
(-0.95) 
- 
Rule of Law     -0.32 
(-4.32)* 
-0.35 
(-4.90)* 
R 0.14 0.45 0.55 0.57 0.63 0.63 
Adj. R 0.13 0.44 0.54 0.55 0.62 0.62 
F  19.16 
(0.000) 
47.96 
(0.000) 
46.79 
(0.000) 
36.71 
(0.000) 
37.73 
(0.000) 
48.18 
(0.000) 
Observations  120 120 120 120 120 120 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 2: Corruption and FI: CS Estimation: Alternative Corruption Indices 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption Index by 
Transparency International (TI) 
Dependent Variable: Corruption Index 
by World Bank (WB) 
FI -0.02 
(-9.47)* 
-0.004 
(-2.49)* 
-0.004 
(-2.45)* 
-0.002 
(-1.62)*** 
-0.01 
(-9.53)* 
-0.002 
(-2.69)* 
-0.001 
(-1.72)* 
PCY  -0.000 
(-10.55)* 
-0.000 
(-9.86)* 
-0.000 
(-8.22)* 
 -0.000 
(-9.70)* 
-0.000 
(-7.15)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
 -0.3 
(-4.88)* 
-0.27 
(-2.38)* 
-0.28 
(-4.87)* 
 -0.18 
(-6.64)* 
-0.18 
(-7.18)* 
Govt. 
Spending  
  -.05 
(-2.62)* 
-.02 
(-1.18) 
  -.01 
(-1.09) 
Rule of Law    -0.4 
(-4.22)* 
  -0.21 
(-5.03)* 
R 0.44 0.78 0.79 0.82 0.43 0.78 0.83 
F  89.66 
(0.000) 
129.12 
(0.000) 
100.47 
 (0.000) 
96.44 
(0.000) 
90.91 
(0.000) 
134.55 
(0.000) 
108.09 
(0.000) 
Observations  118 115 113 113 121 118 116 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3: Corruption and FI: CS Estimation: Sensitivity Analysis 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
FI -0.001 
(1.72)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.57)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.73)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.73)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.77)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.87)*** 
-0.001 
(-1.60)*** 
PCY -0.000 
(-2.62)* 
-0.000 
(-3.09)* 
-0.000 
(-2.66)* 
-0.000 
(-2.72)* 
-0.000 
(-3.36)* 
-0.000 
(-3.21)* 
-0.000 
(-4.62)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.19 
(-4.58)* 
-0.18 
(-4.39)* 
-0.18 
(-4.49)* 
-0.18 
(-4.50)* 
- - - 
Rule of Law -0.32 
(-4.32)* 
-0.31 
(-4.39) 
-0.36 
(-4.95)* 
-0.34 
(-4.90)* 
-0.29 
(-4.22)* 
-0.32 
(-3.56)* 
-0.37 
(-5.20)* 
Govt. Spending  -0.011 
(-0.95)* 
      
Inflation   0.0004 
(1.19) 
     
Trade Openness   0.001 
(0.83) 
    
Urbanization     0.000 
(0.42) 
   
Democracy      -0.28 
(-5.61)* 
  
Military in 
Politics 
     0.117 
(1.95)** 
 
Military 
Expenditures 
      0.05 
(2.03)** 
R 0.14 0.65 0.63 0.63 0.66 0.58 0.62 
Adj. R 0.13 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.65 0.57 0.61 
F  19.16 
(0.000) 
40.67 
(0.000) 
38.58 
(0.000) 
38.58 
(0.000) 
56.27 
(0.000) 
40.21 
(0.000) 
43.96 
(0.000) 
Observations  120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Corruption and FI: CS Estimation: Regional effects 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
FI -0.001 
(-2.99)* 
-0.001 
(-2.21)* 
-0.001 
(-1.96)** 
-0.001 
(-2.46)* 
-0.001 
(-2.41)* 
-0.001 
(-2.32)* 
-0.001 
(-2.16)* 
PCY -0.000 
(-2.13)* 
-0.000 
(-1.47) 
-0.000 
(-1.49) 
-0.000 
(-1.73)*** 
-0.000 
(-1.73)*** 
-0.000 
(-1.61)*** 
-0.000 
(-1.5) 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.18 
(-4.41)* 
-0.18 
(-4.49)* 
-0.21 
(-4.41)* 
-0.18 
(-3.69)* 
-0.18 
(-3.71)* 
-0.17 
(-3.20)* 
-0.18 
(-3.54)* 
Rule of Law -0.35 
(-4.56)* 
-0.42 
(-5.84)* 
-0.38 
(-4.60)* 
-0.40 
(-4.69)* 
-0.40 
(-4.57)* 
-0.37 
(-4.31)* 
-0.37 
(-4.32)* 
East Asia & 
Pacific 
0.024 
(0.13) 
0.01 
(0.55) 
0.12 
(0.63) 
0.20 
(1.07) 
0.21 
(1.10) 
0.35 
(1.30) 
0.69 
(2.41)* 
Europe & 
Central Asia 
 0.62 
(3.21)* 
0.65 
(3.25)* 
0.70 
(3.51)* 
0.72 
(3.52)* 
0.86 
(2.97)* 
1.17 
(4.32)* 
Lat America & 
Caribbean 
  0.24 
(1.25) 
0.23 
(1.23) 
0.25 
(1.30) 
0.41 
(1.49) 
0.78 
(2.56)* 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
   0.28 
(1.52) 
0.28 
(1.55) 
0.44 
(1.62)*** 
0.76 
(2.80)* 
South Asia 
 
    0.13 
(0.40) 
0.32 
(0.80) 
0.68 
(1.64)*** 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
     0.22 
(0.80) 
0.56 
(2.02)* 
Europe        0.51 
(1.94)** 
R 0.63 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.68 
F  34.52 
(0.000) 
34.28 
 (0.000) 
30.61 
(0.000) 
27.68 
(0.000) 
24.69 
(0.000) 
22.45 
(0.000) 
19.83 
(0.000) 
Observations  118 118 118 118 118 118 118 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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 Table 5: Corruption and FI: Regional Panel Estimation  
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
FI -0.004 
(-9.92)* 
-0.001 
(-3.71)* 
-0.002 
(-7.15)* 
-0.002 
(-7.16)* 
-0.002 
(-7.00)* 
-0.002 
(-6.77)* 
-0.002 
(-6.70)* 
-0.002 
(-7.31)* 
PCY  -0.000 
(-4.22)* 
-0.000 
(-3.40)* 
-0.000 
(-2.72)* 
-0.000 
(-3.51)* 
-0.000 
(-6.79)* 
-0.000 
(-2.35)* 
-0.000 
(-3.77)* 
Govt. 
Spending  
 -.04 
(-3.13)* 
-.05 
(-4.97)* 
-.04 
(-3.57)* 
-.03 
(-3.5)* 
-.04 
(-3.97)* 
-.05 
(-5.59)* 
-.05 
(-5.28)* 
Rule of Law  0.4 
(7.15)* 
-0.44 
(-10.12)* 
-0.27 
(-4.97)* 
-0.63 
(-15.25)* 
-0.49 
(-12.53)* 
-0.35 
(-6.90)* 
-0.3 
(-3.30)* 
Trade 
Openness  
  0.01 
(12.29)* 
0.01 
(11.43)* 
0.01 
(10.01)* 
0.01 
(10.49)* 
0.01 
(8.89)* 
0.02 
(11.29)* 
Military in 
Politics 
   0.26 
(4.67)* 
    
Govt. 
Stability  
    0.17 
(9.64)* 
   
Investment 
Profile 
     0.115 
(7.72)* 
  
Democracy        0.17 
(3.56)* 
 
Internal 
conflict 
       -0.08 
(1.7)*** 
R 0.32 0.75 0.86 0.87 0.90 0.89 0.86 0.86 
F  98.40 
(0.000) 
159.96 
(0.000) 
249.58 
(0.000) 
232.28 
(0.000) 
314.99 
(0.000) 
276.19 
(0.000) 
221.70 
(0.000) 
210.43 
(0.000) 
Observations  216 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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 Table 6: Corruption and FI: Regional Panel: Alternative Econometrics Techniques 
Variables Dependent Variable: Corruption 
 2SLS LIML GMM 
FI -0.002 
(-6.93)* 
-0.002 
(-7.00)* 
-0.002 
(-6.42)* 
-0.002 
(-6.31)* 
-0.002 
(-6.42)* 
-0.002 
(-6.31)* 
-0.002 
(-10.63)* 
-0.002 
(-11.74)* 
PCY -0.000 
(-3.55)** 
-0.000 
(-2.90)* 
-0.000 
(-2.50)* 
-0.000 
(-6.72)* 
-0.000 
(-2.50)* 
-0.000 
(-6.71)* 
-0.000 
(-2.22)** 
-0.000 
(-6.81)* 
Govt. 
Spending  
-.05 
(-4.31)* 
-.03 
(-2.81)* 
-.06 
(-5.03)* 
-.03 
(-3.04)* 
-.06 
(-5.03)* 
-.03 
(-3.03)* 
-.06 
(-5.71)* 
-.03 
(-3.32)* 
Rule of Law -0.39 
(-7.67)* 
-0.20 
(-3.31)* 
-0.28 
(-4.91)* 
-0.46 
(-10.6)* 
-0.28 
(-4.89)* 
-0.46 
(-10.6)* 
-0.28 
(-5.60)* 
-0.46 
(-12.80)* 
Open  0.02 
(12.00)* 
0.01 
(11.22)* 
0.01 
(8.32)* 
0.01 
(9.65)* 
0.01 
(8.32)* 
0.01 
(9.65)* 
0.01 
(7.72)* 
0.01 
(9.33)* 
Military in 
Politics 
 0.29 
(4.87)* 
      
Democracy   -0.19 
(-3.82)* 
 -0.20 
(-3.83)* 
 -0.20 
(-3.41)* 
 
Investment 
Profile 
   0.15 
(7.37)* 
 0.15 
(7.35)* 
 0.15 
(6.32)* 
R 0.84 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.86 0.89 0.86 0.89 
Wald 1079.88 
(0.000) 
1238.24 
(0.000) 
1164.03 
(0.000) 
1534.0 
(0.000) 
1163.58 
(0.000) 
1533.53 
(0.000) 
2037.60 
(0.000) 
1915.26 
(0.000) 
Sargan  3.49 
(.06) 
3.08 
(.08) 
2.62 
(0.11) 
2.61 
(0.11) 
2.66 
(0.10) 
2.65 
(0.10) 
  
Basmann 3.42 
(.06) 
2.00 
 (.08) 
2.55 
(0.11) 
2.54 
(0.11) 
2.56 
(0.11) 
2.55 
(0.11) 
  
Hansen       3.53 
(0.06) 
1.67 
(0.20) 
Observations  197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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 Table 7: Corruption and FI: Panel Estimation 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
FI -0.001 
(-4.23)* 
-0.0004 
(-1.68)*** 
-0.0004 
(-2.08)** 
-0.0005 
(-2.22)** 
-0.0004 
(-1.94)*** 
PCY  -0.000 
(-14.77)* 
-0.000 
(-10.64)* 
-0.000 
(-9.19)* 
-0.000 
(-4.69)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
  -0.20 
(-7.79)* 
-0.19 
(-7.53)* 
-0.17 
(-6.72)* 
Govt. 
Spending  
   -0.033 
(-4.29)* 
-0.02 
(-3.20)* 
Rule of Law     -0.29 
(-7.69)* 
R 0.03 0.32 0.38 0.40 0.46 
Adj. R 0.01 0.31 0.37 0.39 0.45 
F  17.90 
(0.000) 
121.25 
(0.000) 
107.79 
(0.000) 
84.02 
(0.000) 
86.71 
(0.000) 
Observations  545 534 529 515 515 
 *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 8: Corruption and FI: Panel Estimation: Sensitivity Analysis (I) 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
FI -0.0004 
(-2.42)* 
-0.0004 
(-2.35)* 
-0.0004 
(-2.05)* 
-0.0004 
(-2.34)* 
-0.0004 
(-2.41)* 
-0.0003 
(-2.04)* 
-0.0005 
(-2.52)* 
-0.0005 
(-2.39)* 
PCY -0.000 
(-1.62)*** 
-0.000 
(-2.84)* 
-0.000 
(-2.69)* 
-0.000 
(-1.81)** 
-0.000 
(-2.86)** 
-0.000 
(-5.24)** 
-0.000 
(-3.34)* 
-0.000 
(-2.31)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.19 
(-8..02)* 
-0.19 
(-8.28)* 
-0.12 
(-2.93)* 
-0.17 
(-6.49)* 
-0.19 
(-8.19)* 
-0.11 
(-3.89)* 
-0.18 
(-7.73)* 
-0.20 
(-8.14)* 
Rule of Law -0.34 
(-9.13)* 
-0.36 
(-10.03)* 
-0.33 
(-8.71)* 
-0.32 
(-8.09)* 
-0.37 
(-9.70)* 
-0.29 
(-7.51)* 
-0.36 
(-9.63)* 
-0.37 
(-9.89)* 
Govt. Spending  -0.025 
(-3.51)* 
       
Trade 
Openness 
 0.003 
(3.68)* 
      
Democracy   -0.144 
(-3.19)* 
     
Military in 
Politics 
   0.08 
(2.41)* 
    
Education     0.004 
(2.27)* 
   
Remittances       0.018 
(2.14)** 
  
Inflation        0.002 
(4.87)* 
 
Urbanization        0.000 
(1.16) 
R 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.49 0.50 0.45 
Adj. R 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.48 0.49 0.44 
F  82.16 
(0.000) 
85.66 
(0.000) 
86.52 
(0.000) 
84.93 
(0.000) 
77.51 
(0.000) 
81.52 
(0.000) 
96.46 
(0.000) 
83.32 
(0.000) 
Observations  545 510 510 519 489 439 495 519 
 *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9: Corruption and FI: Panel Estimation: Sensitivity Analysis (II) 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
FI -0.0004 
(-2.42)* 
-0.0004 
(-2.09)* 
-0.0004 
(-1.94)** 
-0.0004 
(-1.98)** 
-0.0005 
(-2.40)* 
-0.0005 
(-2.31)* 
-0.0005 
(-2.33)* 
-0.0004 
(-2.17)* 
PCY -0.000 
(-1.62)*** 
-0.000 
(-2.67)* 
-0.000 
(-2.29)* 
-0.000 
(-2.21)* 
-0.000 
(-4.47)* 
-0.000 
(-2.54)* 
-0.000 
(-2.37)* 
-0.000 
(-2.93)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.19 
(-8.02)* 
-0.18 
(-7.70)* 
-0.22 
(-8.88)* 
-0.21 
(-8.45)* 
-0.24 
(-10.35)* 
-0.18 
(-7.04)* 
-0.20 
(-8.17)* 
-0.21 
(-10.26)* 
Rule of Law -0.34 
(-9.13)* 
-0.46 
(-11.78)* 
-0.47 
(-9.89)* 
-0.39 
(-9.94)* 
-0.43 
(-11.84)* 
-0.35 
(-9.26)* 
-0.37 
(-9.12)* 
-0.42 
(-12.34)* 
Govt. Spending  -0.025 
(-3.51)* 
       
Government 
Stability 
 0.13 
(6.15)* 
      
Internal Conflict   0.085 
(3.52)* 
     
External Conflict    0.045 
(1.97)** 
    
Investment 
Profile 
    0.168 
(7.66)* 
   
Religion in 
Politics 
     -0.065 
(-1.98)** 
  
Ethno linguistic       0.002 
(4.87)* 
 
yr1994        -0.07 
(-0.61) 
yr1999        0.323 
(2.74)* 
yr2004        0.84 
(7.46)* 
yr2007        1.16 
(10.42)* 
R 0.45 0.49 0.46 0.46 0.50 0.46 0.45 0.60 
Adj. R 0.42 0.48 0.45 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.44 0.59 
F  82.16 
(0.000) 
96.52 
(0.000) 
87.31 
(0.000) 
84.93 
(0.000) 
77.51 
(0.000) 
84.25 
(0.000) 
82.87 
(0.000) 
95.01 
(0.000) 
Observations  505 519 519 519 519 519 519 519 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10: Corruption and FI: Panel Estimation: Random Effects (I) 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
FI -0.0002 
(-1.89)** 
-0.0002 
(-1.91)** 
-0.0002 
(-1.71)*** 
-0.0002 
(-1.62)*** 
-0.0003 
(-3.24)* 
-0.0002 
(-1.70)*** 
-0.0003 
(-2.40)* 
-0.0002 
(-2.03)** 
PCY -0.000 
(-3.15)* 
-0.000 
(-3.92)* 
-0.000 
(-4.21)* 
-0.000 
(-3.58)* 
-0.000 
(-5.06)* 
-0.000 
(-4.62)** 
-0.000 
(-3.99)* 
-0.000 
(-4.02)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.10 
(-2.81)* 
-0.10 
(-2.85)* 
-0.08 
(-1.71)*** 
-0.07 
(-1.85)*** 
-0.15 
(-4.12)*** 
-0.06 
(-1.83)* 
-0.08 
(-2.29)* 
-0.10 
(-2.84)* 
Rule of Law -0.24 
(-6.26)* 
-0.26 
(-6.63)* 
-0.23 
(-5.67)* 
-0.19 
(-4.59)* 
-0.27 
(-6.58)* 
-0.26 
(-6.13)* 
-0.24 
(-6.39)* 
-0.24 
(-6.19)* 
Govt. Spending  -0.033 
(-3.88)* 
       
Trade 
Openness 
 0.005 
(3.12)* 
      
Democracy   -0.05 
(-1.03) 
     
Military in 
Politics 
   0.10 
(2.93)* 
    
Education      0.01 
(4.85)* 
   
Remittances       0.02 
(2.22)** 
  
Inflation        0.0001 
(1.26) 
 
Urbanization        0.000 
(2.66)* 
RB 0.58 0.56 0.63 0.60 0.58 0.66 0.61 0.59 
RO 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.43 0.51 0.48 0.45 
Wald 148.99 
(0.000) 
140.81 
(0.000) 
147.68 
(0.000) 
143.65 
(0.000) 
147.72 
(0.000) 
166.15 
(0.000) 
132.94 
(0.000) 
127.07 
(0.000) 
Observations  515 520 529 529 499 439 503 529 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 11: Corruption and FI: Panel Estimation: Random Effects (II) 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
FI -0.0002 
(-2.26)** 
-0.0002 
(-1.93)** 
-0.0002 
(-1.80)** 
-0.0002 
(-2.63)* 
-0.0002 
(-2.64)* 
-0.0003 
(-3.39)* 
-0.0002 
(-2.58)* 
-0.0002 
(-2.56)* 
PCY -0.000 
(-5.91)* 
-0.000 
(-4.08)* 
-0.000 
(-3.99)* 
-0.000 
(-5.35)* 
-0.000 
(-5.39)* 
-0.000 
(-5.19)* 
-0.000 
(-5.34)* 
-0.000 
(-3.02)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.17 
(-5.55)* 
-0.09 
(-2.52)* 
-0.10 
(-3.03)* 
-0.15 
(-5.29)* 
-0.15 
(-5.49)* 
-0.17 
(-5.96)* 
-0.16 
(-5.70)* 
-0.13 
(-4.06)* 
Rule of Law -0.31 
(-8.67)* 
-0.21 
(-5.16)* 
-0.24 
(-5.62)* 
-0.26 
(-5.85)* 
-0.28 
(-7.75)* 
-0.22 
(-5.83)* 
-0.29 
(-8.18)* 
-0.26 
(-6.70)* 
Investment 
Profiles 
0.17 
(9.91* 
       
Religion in 
Politics 
 -0.09 
(-2.48)* 
      
Ethno linguistic   0.01 
(0.22) 
     
Internal Conflict    -.02 
(-0.76) 
    
External Conflict     -.01 
(-0.42) 
   
Government 
Stability 
     -0.14 
(-5.03)* 
  
yr1994    -0.09 
(-0.76) 
-0.08 
(-0.65) 
-0.11 
(-1.07) 
-0.09 
(-0.81) 
-0.10 
(-0.92) 
yr1999    0.15 
(1.42) 
0.15 
(1.20) 
0.33 
(3.38) 
0.13 
(1.22) 
.081 
(0.76) 
yr2004    0.68 
(6.59)* 
0.68 
(6.81)* 
1.14 
(9.63)* 
0.66 
(6.48)* 
0.62 
(6.03)* 
yr2007    1.02 
(9.61)* 
1.01 
(8.79)* 
1.38 
(12.55)* 
0.99 
(9.79)* 
0.94 
(9.07)* 
East Asia & 
Pacific 
       0.77 
(2.59)* 
Europe & 
Central Asia 
       0.95 
(3.32)* 
Lat America & 
Caribbean 
       0.83 
(2.63)* 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
       0.79 
(2.75)* 
South Asia 
 
       0.96 
(2.56)* 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
       0.68 
(2.28)** 
Europe         0.05 
(0.19) 
RB 0.61 0.60 0.61 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.71 
RO 0.49 0.45 0.45 0.58 0.58 0.60 0.58 0.61 
F  271.48 
(0.000) 
136.63 
(0.000) 
130.78 
(0.000) 
473.78 
(0.000) 
474.86 
(0.000) 
569.36 
(0.000) 
474.65 
(0.000) 
761.47 
(0.000) 
Observations  529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 12: Corruption and FI: Panel Estimation (System GMM) 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
FI -0.0004 
(-4.78)* 
-0.0004 
(-5.37)* 
-0.0004 
(-5.37)* 
-0.0004 
(-4.96)* 
-0.0004 
(-5.27)* 
-0.0004 
(-5.52)* 
-0.0004 
(-5.36)* 
PCY -0.000 
(-4.26)* 
-0.000 
(-4.07)* 
-0.000 
(-4.41)* 
-0.000 
(-4.22)* 
-0.000 
(-4.87)* 
-0.000 
(-4.28)* 
-0.000 
(-3.99)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.15 
(-5.41)* 
-0.16 
(-5.25)* 
-0.16 
(-5.43)* 
-0.13 
(-3.63)* 
-0.14 
(-4.72)* 
-0.15 
(-5.04)* 
-0.17 
(-5.45)* 
Rule of Law -0.34 
(-6.83)* 
-0.32 
(-6.17)* 
-0.31 
(-6.44)* 
-0.29 
(-5.50)* 
-0.29 
(-4.85)* 
-0.32 
(-6.31)* 
-0.29 
(-5.81)* 
Inflation  0.0001 
(3.15)* 
0.0001 
(3.04)* 
0.0001 
(3.54)* 
0.0001 
(3.24)* 
0.0001 
(1.83)*** 
0.0001 
(3.28)* 
0.0001 
(3.38)* 
Trade 
Openness  
 0.001 
(0.60) 
     
Government 
Spending  
  -0.012 
(-1.12) 
    
Military in 
Politics  
   0.08 
(2.08)** 
   
Internal 
Conflict 
    -.03 
(-1.22) 
  
External 
Conflict 
     -.03 
(-1.12) 
 
Government 
Stability 
      -.09 
(-2.79)* 
Yr1994 -0.11 
(-1.75)*** 
-0.18 
(-2.89)* 
-0.16 
(-2.42)* 
-0.11 
(-1.80)*** 
-0.12 
(-1.82)*** 
-0.08 
(-1.12)*** 
-0.13 
(-1.85)*** 
Yr1999 0.15 
(1.36) 
0.07 
(0.58) 
0.09 
(0.74) 
0.13 
(1.11) 
0.18 
(1.60)*** 
0.21 
(1.61)*** 
0.29 
(2.87)* 
Yr2004 0.67 
(5.14)* 
0.62 
(4.57)* 
0.61 
(4.54)* 
0.67 
(5.01)* 
0.71 
(5.21)* 
0.70 
(4.89)* 
0.97 
(6.74)* 
Yr2007 1.03 
(7.98)* 
0.95 
(6.95)* 
0.97 
(7.25)* 
1.02 
(8.11)* 
1.07 
(7.86)* 
1.04 
(7.29)* 
1.26 
(9.23)* 
Over id 70.42 
(0.07) 
80.45 
 (0.07) 
79.08 
(0.08) 
80.12 
(0.07) 
76.58  
(0.12) 
79.69  
(0.08) 
79.94 
(0.11) 
Hansen dif 18.52 
(0.42) 
20.27 
(0.50) 
18.05 
(0.65) 
23.27 
(0.33) 
23.47 
(0.32) 
24.46 
(0.27) 
20.40 
(0.50) 
No of groups 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 
No of 
Instruments 
64 74 74 74 74 74 74 
Wald 403.02 
(0.000) 
381.87 
(0.000) 
458.78 
 (0.000) 
415.32 
 (0.000) 
408.26 
(0.000) 
402.76 
(0.000) 
404.95 
(0.000) 
AR1 0.36 0.31 0.24 0.46 0.31 0.38 0.83 
AR2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Observations  503 494 490 503 503 503 503 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 13: Corruption and FI: CS Estimation: Developing Countries 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
FI -0.001 
(-2.31)* 
-0.001 
(-2.67)* 
-0.001 
(-2.88)* 
-0.001 
(-2.99)* 
-0.001 
(-2.90)* 
-0.001 
(-3.06)* 
PCY  -0.000 
(-3.05)* 
-0.000 
(-1.65)*** 
-0.000 
(-0.86) 
-0.000 
(-0.94) 
-0.000 
(-0.65) 
Economic 
Freedom 
  -0.13 
(-2.47)* 
-0.12 
(-2.53)* 
-0.12 
(-2.67)* 
-0.14 
(-3.02)* 
Govt. 
Spending  
  -0.03 
(2.39)* 
-0.01 
(-1.71)*** 
-0.03 
(-2.22)** 
-.04 
(-2.59)* 
Rule of 
Law 
   -0.21 
(-2.47)* 
-0.17 
(-2.00)** 
-0.20 
(-2.44)* 
Inflation     0.001 
(2.62)* 
0.001 
(3.18)* 
Trade 
Openness 
     0.001 
(2.00)** 
R 0.03 0.11 0.20 0.26 0.32 0.36 
F  5.36 
(0.023) 
6.40 
(0.003) 
4.95 
(0.001) 
5.50 
(0.000) 
8.34 
(0.000) 
10.21 
(0.000) 
Observatio
ns  
93 92 90 90 89 89 
 
Table 14: Corruption and FI: CS Estimation: Non-linearity  
Variables  Dependent Variable: 
Corruption Index by TI 
Dependent Variable: 
Corruption Index by WB 
Dependent Variable: 
Corruption Index by ICRG 
FI -0.018 
(-4.91)* 
-0.014 
(-4.04)* 
-0.008 
(-4.93)* 
-0.006 
(-4.00)* 
-0.006 
(-2.30)** 
-0.004 
(-1.41) 
PCY -0.000 
(-10.77)* 
-0.000 
(-9.04)* 
-0.000 
(-9.64)* 
-0.000 
(-7.84)* 
-0.000 
(-5.20)* 
-0.000 
(-3.63)* 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.26 
(-4.42)* 
-0.26 
(-4.86)* 
-0.16 
(-6.40)* 
-0.17 
(-7.25)* 
-0.25 
(-6.29)* 
-0.26 
(-6.85)* 
Govt. 
Spending  
-.03 
(-1.60)*** 
-.009 
(-0.52) 
-.015 
(-1.86)*** 
-.003 
(-0.45) 
-.001 
(-0.07) 
-.015 
(-1.22) 
Rule of 
Law 
 -0.34 
(-3.66)* 
 -0.19 
(-4.53)* 
 -0.24 
(-3.56)* 
FI Square 0.000 
(4.22)* 
0.000 
(3.67)* 
0.000 
(4.16)* 
0.000 
(3.58)* 
0.000 
(2.20)** 
0.000 
(1.60) 
R 0.82 0.84 0.82 0.85 0.61 0.66 
F  96.47 
 (0.000) 
91.96  
0.000) 
100.37 
(0.000) 
101.87 
(0.000) 
35.30 
 (0.000) 
34.66 
 (0.000) 
Observatio
ns  
113 113 116 116 116 116 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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  Table 15: Corruption and FI: Panel Estimation: Excluding Outliers  
Variables  Full Sample Corruption Index > 1 Corruption Index < 5 
FI -0.0004 
(-2.42)* 
-0.0004 
(-2.49)* 
-0.0004 
(-2.18)* 
-0.0004 
(-1.86)*** 
-0.0004 
(-1.92)** 
PCY -0.000 
(-1.62)*** 
-0.000 
(-1.01) 
-0.000 
(-3.00)* 
-0.000 
(-6.04)** 
-0.000 
(-5.61)** 
Economic 
Freedom 
-0.19 
(-8..02)* 
-0.11 
(-4.92)* 
-0.07 
(-2.43)* 
-0.14 
(-5.95)* 
-0.13 
(-5.20)* 
Rule of Law -0.34 
(-9.13)* 
-0.24 
(-7.15)* 
-0.21 
(-5.40)* 
-0.23 
(-6.32)* 
-0.22 
(-5.60)* 
Govt. Spending  -0.025 
(-3.51)* 
-.013 
(-2.06)** 
-.02 
(-2.21)** 
-.02 
(-2.80)* 
-.02 
(-3.56)* 
Trade 
Openness 
  0.001 
(1.05) 
 0.004 
(4.39)* 
Military in 
Politics 
  0.07 
(2.11)** 
 0.05 
(1.6)*** 
Education   0.005 
(2.70)** 
  
Remittances    0.01 
(1.74)*** 
  
R 0.45 0.25 0.29 0.45 0.47 
Adj. R 0.42 0.24 0.27 0.44 0.46 
F  82.16 
(0.000) 
30.76 
(0.000) 
16.60 
(0.000) 
77.84 
(0.000) 
60.43 
(0.000) 
Observations  545 467 368 487 484 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 16: Corruption and FI:  A Spatial Analysis 
Variables  Dependent Variable: Corruption 
SWC2  0.56 
(3.43)* 
0.30 
(1.91)** 
0.20 
(1.67)*** 
0.19 
(1.60)*** 
0.25 
(2.04)** 
0.2 
(1.70)*** 
FI  -.001 
(-2.20)** 
-.001 
(-2.94)* 
-.001 
(-2.96)* 
-.001 
(-2.06)** 
-.001 
(-2.87)* 
PCY  -0.000 
(-5.35)* 
-0.000 
(-2.13)** 
-0.000 
(-2.06)** 
-0.000 
(-1.20) 
-0.000 
(-1.95)** 
Economic 
Freedom 
  -0.18 
(-4.35)* 
-0.18 
(-4.38)* 
-0.11 
(-2.76)* 
-0.17 
(-4.28)* 
Rule of law   -0.34 
(-4.52)* 
-0.32 
(-4.04)* 
-0.23 
(-3.00)* 
-0.37 
(-5.50)* 
Government 
spending  
   -0.009 
(-0.84) 
  
Bureaucracy 
quality  
    -0.37 
(-3.77)* 
 
British Colony       -0.15 
(-1.19) 
R 0.08 0.47 0.64 0.64 0.68 0.66 
F  12.08 
(0.000) 
25.78 
(0.000) 
38.35 
(0.000) 
32.10 
(0.000) 
37.67 
(0.000) 
31.61 
(0.000) 
Observations  140 120 118 117 118 115 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 17: Corruption and Contagion: A spatial analysis with different lag lengths 
Variables  SWC(99-03) SWC(94-98) SWC(89-93) SWC(84-88) 
SWC  0.21 
(2.31)* 
0.19 
(2.41)* 
0.19 
(2.43)* 
0.19 
(2.42)* 
PCY -0.000 
(-2.33)* 
-0.000 
(-1.26) 
-0.000 
(-1.26) 
-0.000 
(-0.25) 
Democracy  -0.21 
(-3.89) 
-0.25 
(-4.77)* 
-0.16 
(-2.43)* 
-0.27 
(-5.26)* 
Bureaucracy 
Quality 
-0.30 
(-3.18)* 
-0.24 
(-2.72)* 
-0.26 
(-5.0)* 
-0.21 
(-2.35)* 
Rule of Law -0.24 
(-3.69)* 
-0.35 
(-5.36)* 
-0.36 
(-5.41)* 
-0.41 
(-6.15)* 
R 0.76 0.80 0.80 0.81 
Adj. R 0.75 0.79 0.79 0.80 
F  79.40 
(0.000) 
94.56 
 (0.000) 
95.78 
(0.000) 
96.91 
(0.000) 
Observations  134 125 123 117 
*, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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 Appendix  
Table 1: Description of Variables 
Variables  Definitions Sources 
Per capita real GDP GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$).  World Bank database World Bank (2008) 
Credit as % of GDP Credit as % of GDP represents claims on the non-financial 
private sector. 
World Bank database, World Bank (2008) 
M2 as % of GDP It represents Broad money (money and quasi money). World Bank database, World Bank (2008) 
Financial 
Intermediation (FI) 
The level of Financial Intermediation is determined by adding 
M2 as a % of GDP and credit to private sector as % of GDP. 
World Bank database, World Bank (2008) 
Trade Openness It is the sum of exports and imports as a share of real GDP.  World Bank database, World Bank (2008) 
Corruption  ICRG index 0-6 scale; where 6 indicate high degree of 
corruption and 0 indicate no corruption. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Corruption  Transparency International corruption index rescaled from 0 
(absence of corruption) to 10 (highest corruption). 
Transparency International.  
Corruption  World Bank corruption index rescaled from -2.5 (absence of 
corruption) to 2.5 (highest corruption). 
World Bank.  
Democracy  ICRG index 0-6 scale; where 6 indicate high degree of 
democracy. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Military in Politics ICRG index 0-6 scale; higher risk ratings (6) indicate a greater 
degree of military participation in politics and a higher level of 
political risk. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Religion in Politics ICRG index 0-6 scale: higher ratings are given to countries 
where religious tensions are minimal. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Ethnic Tensions ICRG index 0-6 scale; higher ratings are given to countries 
where tensions are minimal. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Rule of Law ICRG index 0-6 scale; where 6 indicate high degree of law and 
order. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Bureaucracy Quality ICRG index 0-4 scale; where 4 indicate high degree of law and 
order. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Government Stability ICRG index 0-12 scale; where 0 indicates very high risk and 
12 indicates very low risk. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Socioeconomic 
Conditions 
ICRG index 0-12 scale; where 0 indicates very high risk and 
12 indicates very low risk. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Investment Profiles ICRG index 0-12 scale; where 0 indicates very high risk and 
12 indicates very low risk. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Internal Conflict ICRG index 0-12 scale; where 0 indicates very high risk and 
12 indicates very low risk. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
External Conflict ICRG index 0-12 scale; where 0 indicates very high risk and 
12 indicates very low risk. 
International Country Risk Guide, PRS group. 
Economic Freedom Freedom House data. index  rescaled 0 (low economic 
freedom)-7 (high economic freedom) 
Fraser Institute. 
Inflation  Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) World Bank database, World Bank (2008) 
Government 
Spending  
General government final consumption expenditure (% 
of GDP) 
World Bank database, World Bank (2008) 
Remittances  Workers' remittances and compensation of employees, 
received (% of GDP) 
World Bank database, World Bank (2008) 
Military Spending  Military expenditure (% of GDP) World Bank database, World Bank (2008) 
Arm Trade Arms exports plus arms imports  (constant 1990 US$) World Bank database, World Bank (2008) 
Education The secondary school enrollment as % of age group is at the 
beginning of the period.  
World Bank database, World Bank (2008) 
Urbanization  Urban Population  World Bank database, World Bank (2008) 
British Colony A dummy variable that is 1 for British Colony  http://flagspot.net/flags/gb-colon.html 
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